Industrial Policy (IP) has dominated conversations in economic and political circles thanks to President Biden’s big investments in manufacturing, infrastructure, and working Americans. But according to today’s guest, development economist Isabel Estevez, the conversation around IP is too narrow. IP is not just about manufacturing and clean energy, she argues—smart IP also encompasses policies that improve outcomes for people, like reducing child poverty and cleaning our drinking water.
Isabel Estevez is the Deputy Director of Industrial Policy and Trade at the Roosevelt Institute. She conducts research at the intersection of industrial and trade policy, with a focus on the transformation and decarbonization of heavy industries, such as steel and aluminum.
Twitter: @Isabel_Estevez_
Industrial Transformations https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/industrial-transformations
The American Industrial Policy Series https://rooseveltinstitute.org/think-tank/climate-and-economic-transformation/the-american-industrial-policy-series
Website: https://pitchforkeconomics.com
Twitter: @PitchforkEcon
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Nick’s twitter: @NickHanauer
David Goldstein:
I think part of the narrow approach to industrial policy comes from the fact that we’re using that narrow word, industrial.
Isabel Estevez:
I think industrial policy can mean slightly different things to different people, but fundamentally, it’s really about influencing and shaping the world of production.
Nick Hanauer:
We’ve let industrial policy become a widget maximization strategy. I think it’s even worse than that. I think it’s a profit maximization for the widget manufacturers.
Narrator:
From the Home offices of Civic Ventures in downtown Seattle, this is Pitchfork Economics with Nick Hanauer, the best place to get the truth about who gets what and why.
Nick Hanauer:
I’m Nick Hanauer, founder of Civic Ventures.
David Goldstein:
I’m David Goldstein, senior fellow at Civic Enters. As I’m sure you know, Nick, there’s been a lot of noise the past couple months over the Biden administration’s proposals for the CHIPS Act, and the fact that, oh my God, to get some of that 400 million free dollars to invest in semiconductor plants, the manufacturers are going to have to do all types of awful things like, oh, provide childcare, pay decent wages, not take the money and send it directly to shareholders and stock buybacks. That’s socialism, Nick.
Nick Hanauer:
Yeah. Socialism or industrial policy.
David Goldstein:
Same difference, right?
Nick Hanauer:
Yeah, same thing. Exactly, yeah. So today on the pod, we’re going to explore a little bit about the resurgence of what we’re calling industrial policy, probably incorrectly terming it industrial policy. We’re certainly going to talk to the enormous investments that the Biden administration is making in all sectors of the economy through the CHIPS and Science Act, the IRA and the infrastructure bill, because this is a very significant moment in the transformation of the economy in the United States because industrial policy, of course, went out of fashion with the advent of neoliberalism, and we really haven’t invested in America in a very, very long time. And with us today to chat about it is a developmental economist named Isabel Estevez, who works for the Roosevelt Institute. She conducts research at the intersection of industrial and trade policy. I think this is a subject we’re going to spend a lot of time on the pod talking about because it’s so consequential. But with that, let’s chat with Isabel.
Isabel Estevez:
I am Isabel Estevez. I’m a development economist working on economic transformation and green industrial policy. I currently am deputy director of industrial policy and trade at the Roosevelt Institute with our climate and Economic Transformation Program.
Nick Hanauer:
So Isabel, tell us what industrial policy is and why we should or shouldn’t do it.
Isabel Estevez:
I think industrial policy can mean slightly different things to different people, but fundamentally it’s really about influencing and shaping the world of production, the way we create value, what kinds of goods and services our society makes, and also very importantly, how we make things, how we produce things. So for example, it deals with questions like, are we making enough steel to meet our housing and transportation needs? Or are we making enough and building enough renewable energy infrastructure to deal with climate change? But at the same time, it also asks questions like, are we making that steel, are we making those solar panels, are we producing energy in a way that’s exploiting workers or poisoning communities? Or are we making it in a way that leaves us all better off? Specific functions of industrial policy can vary pretty widely. You can use it for pretty narrow purposes like increasing mass production during a pandemic, or you can use it for much more ambitious purposes like transforming poor countries into rich industrialized countries.
In fact, that’s been one of the main uses of industrial policy historically, but independently of the goal, whether you’re building more widgets or transforming economies, industrial policy is fundamentally about shaping production, about figuring out what goods and services are critical to our collective wellbeing, and then figuring out what kinds of policy tools we can leverage to make those goods or change the way that we make them. And that includes everything from public investment to regulation, trade policy, public procurement, you name it. There’s really a wide range of tools that we can deploy in the service of industrial policy. So figuring out how to use those tools to shape production in line with public interest goals is what industrial policymaking is fundamentally about.
David Goldstein:
So industrial policy, it’s an old term, we used to use it, we used to embrace it, and then it kind of disappeared for a couple of decades. Is it new that we’re kind of re-embracing it again under the Biden administration?
Isabel Estevez:
Yeah, that’s a great question, and I think it is important to stop and acknowledge that it’s great that we’re even having these conversations in the US right now about industrial policy because yes, in recent decades with the rise of neoliberalism, industrial policy really fell out of fashion in the public discourse. And the IMF famously called it the policy that shall not be named because it was seen as interventionist or antithetical to the free market.
But I think as people have increasingly realized that first of all, there is no such thing as a free market, and we have to be more thoughtful about the way that we shape the economy if we want to get different results than what neoliberalism has given us, we’re finally talking about industrial policy again, and that’s a very hopeful change. But industrial policy has really been with us this entire time, and the US itself has always had industrial policy. There’s kind of a running joke now that whenever people talk about industrial policy in the US, they have to start with referencing Alexander Hamilton talking about his report on manufacturers to show the deep roots that industrial policy has in the US. But really it’s been a feature of economic policymaking throughout the world, and especially in rich countries that have used industrial policy to become rich to industrialize.
Nick Hanauer:
So what happened? Why the renewed interest in industrial policy? And obviously we’re having a lot when you count up CHIPS and the IRA and the infrastructure plan and so on and so forth.
Isabel Estevez:
Part of the reason is, like I said before, just that people are realizing that we have to manage the economy more proactively to get better outcomes than what we’ve had when we are not managing the economy proactively. But part of it I think also has to do with the growing recognition of the urgency of doing something about climate change and the profound productive energy transformation that requires. So I think a lot of credit really goes to climate advocates really for putting industrial policy back on the public agenda. At the same time, I think something else that really pushed this discussion around industrial policy to come back was the pandemic and the kinds of supply chain vulnerabilities that we saw that led us to recognize that we also need to be investing in local manufacturing to be able to have some level of economic security that’s founded on domestic productive capacity.
Nick Hanauer:
So can you explain what were the elements of neoliberal orthodoxy that taught policymakers or encouraged policymakers not to do industrial policy over the last 40 or 50 years?
Isabel Estevez:
There are lots of elements to the doctrine, right? Because it is fundamentally doctrine. I think the most fundamental is that markets naturally lead to economically optimal outcomes if they’re left to their own devices. And that in and of itself is highly problematic just because it doesn’t recognize the fact that markets from the very beginning of time have been actively shaped by political forces of some kind. So fundamental myth there is really the myth of a free market, that it exists at all. But that kind of discourse has been used repeatedly to insinuate or argue that any kind of state action that tries to shape markets in particular ways or even state action that involves doing things that the private sector would normally do, like production, that those things are going to lead to suboptimal economic outcomes just by definition, because it would be interfering with a free functioning of a market that always by definition optimally leads to optimal economic results.
I think that’s at the core of it. So then that kind of fundamental argumentation was used to justify deregulation because deregulation was seen as anti investment and anti jobs and anti-growth. It was used as a justification for outsourcing production to wherever it was cheapest, because the argument was that if you outsource production to the cheapest location, then you get cheaper products, and that’s good for consumers. But all of these kinds of phenomena and these kinds of justifications, it turned out were completely unfounded. And what we’ve seen instead of becoming prosperity during this period of neoliberalism is really a decline, a decline in the middle class, a decline in the working class, stagnant wages, and not at all what we were promised. So I think that’s really realizing that what we were promised by neoliberalism is not what we’re getting, is again, leading to this resurgence of industrial policy as a means of managing the economy in a way that leads to actual prosperity.
Nick Hanauer:
That’s an excellent answer. I think you hit on the sort of high points. It’s unambiguously true that the country, the Biden middle out agenda, includes the most substantive and substantial investment in the material capacities of the country, you can call that industrial policy, really probably, well, maybe ever, certainly since Roosevelt. So we’re basically restarting a process that we used to do, but it has to be true that there are good ways and less effective ways of doing industrial policy and having tried to do big things before, I know it’s always a messy process of some wins and some losses. How do you think about a guiding policy for the best outcomes?
David Goldstein:
Are there some simple heuristics, rules of thumb to follow when thinking through industrial policy?
Isabel Estevez:
For sure. I think there are definitely heuristics, there are principles, but I think one thing that I really want to discuss here is that as this return of industrial policy or as industrial policy has been returned to the public discourse, I think we have a tendency to think about it quite narrowly still. I think we’re still thinking about it as primarily a tool for really making more widgets. For making more of certain products that we’ve decided are strategic, and that kind of paradigm is really holding us back from seeing it potentially as a tool for building wellbeing, for building human flourishing. And that may sound pretty lofty, but there are actually quite straightforward ways that we can be aiming toward and starting to build an industrial policy that does those things. So one of the things that I think is quite crucial is to think about the range of goals that industrial policy should be aiming for as being quite comprehensive.
So right now, I think our industrial policy’s primarily focused on economic resilience, supply chains, and of course on the renewable energy build out to deal with climate challenges. But I think there’s a pretty significant case to be made that we should also be thinking about how industrial policy can be used to also increase the wellbeing of workers, to increase the wellbeing of communities, to have not just net-zero emissions targets, but also things like zero hunger targets, zero toxic hotspots targets, and work actively and investment productive activities that are helping us meet a arrangeable being targets at the same time.
And in the specific context right now of the implementation of the Inflation Reduction Act and other industrial policies that are underway, I think the easiest way to work to move away from a kind of widget maximization kind of industrial policy to an industrial policy that’s really about human flourishing is to start building in standards into these investments to start making sure that as we disperse these massive, massive funding streams, that we are attaching the right set of labor standards, equity standards, even environmental standards, to make sure that the money that we’re spending is being spent in a way that’s not just making more widgets, but also making the lives of workers better and the lives of communities better.
And there are lots of proposals for how to do that, but I think it’s an important sort of paradigm shift that has to underline that shift from widget maximization to industrial strategy for her wellbeing.
David Goldstein:
You know, you talk about a paradigm shift. I’m wondering whether part of the difficulty in making that shift is the term industrial policy, because when we use that word industrial, we instantly think of industry, of smokestacks of manufacturing, that the purpose of the policy is to make our industry resilient and thrive when, as you say, the actual goal is human flourishing. We agree with that 100%, that your doing any of these policies are to improve the lives of the American people. Are we making a mistake by using old language to describe new policy?
Isabel Estevez:
Yeah, that’s a great question. I think there is a little bit of that. I think there’s a tendency to think about industrial policy, especially nowadays as being especially about industry, and especially about heavy industry. But I think the way that it’s been used historically is if you take it up just a level of abstraction, it’s really about how you change productive systems to deliver value and to deliver wellbeing. If you even just think about the economic sectors and the productive sectors that are relevant to wellbeing, I think you by definition have to think not just about heavy industry and not just about energy, but also think about the productive sectors that are, for instance, producing our food.
So our various sustainable food and agriculture system, which needs, I would argue, a very strong industrial policy to figure out how we reshape it so that we’re producing food sustainably and making sure that our food is nutritious. Similarly, the care sector, childcare, adult care or the reparative sector. So the reparative work that needs to be done to fix toxic pollution hotspots and to rehabilitative ecosystems. These are sectors that require work, that require investment. And they may not be thought of as industries in some kind of conventional heavy industry sense, but they are industries in the sense that they imply work that needs to be done to create value that we all need to ensure wellbeing.
Nick Hanauer:
I love your widget maximization frame. I think that’s smart and clever, but I think in many ways, it’s not even that. It’s the industrial policy is often aimed at maximizing the profitability of the people who make the widgets. It’s not even making the most widgets. One of the sort of great examples that’s coming up right now is this tussle over whether CHIPS fabs should have to provide a little childcare for the workers that they want to hire to make the CHIPS and the squawking that has taken place from the people who may have to moderate their margins by one 10th of 1% or something like that in order to accommodate something like that. And it’s just, that’s a remarkably stupid tussle, but it is illustrative of the push and pull of what the purpose of this project is.
Isabel Estevez:
Absolutely. First of all, it is extremely unfortunate that you’ve seen this kind of resistance from some sectors to the administration’s efforts to include labor standards, childcare standards, community benefit agreements, these kinds of conditions that they’ve made some effort to include in much of IRA money. And it is very disheartening to see that people who even considered as progressives are actively advocating against these standards and guardrails that are exactly what you need when you’re trying to transition from, yes, not just a widget maximizing industrial policy, but an industrial policy that has historically concentrated benefits for very few people who need those benefits the least. And we’re trying to move from that to a coherent national development strategy.
Nick Hanauer:
But despite all the squawking, they still did get 450 applications for the federal money.
Isabel Estevez:
Exactly.
Nick Hanauer:
In spite of the onerous childcare provisions.
Isabel Estevez:
Exactly. I think there is demand for the money, the money is going out the door, and there’s plenty of money to go around. So I think there’s really plenty of money to make sure that we’re investing in the right way and attaching high standards to these projects.
Nick Hanauer:
So what’s next for industrial policy?
Isabel Estevez:
I think there’s a lot that can be done, and like I said, I think there’s a need to think more globally, more comprehensively about the public policy goals, the public purpose goals that industrial policy can serve. So I think it would be helpful to have more discussion around that and certainly more policy engagement around that. One of the biggest things that we need to do is invest in our administrative capacity as well in industrial policy to build out planning capacity, to build out prospective research capacity, to do things like what the administration’s already begun to do with their supply chain reports, for instance, that came out last year. But really take that up to more systematic analysis and industrial policy planning. Also, like I said before, I think we need to think more comprehensively about the range of sectors that industrial policy should be covering and how we deliver value by investing across economic sectors that are significant and critical to people’s wellbeing.
And I also would hope that, I think one of the things that’s holding us back a bit from making these jumps into a more proactive industrial policy is partially just being trapped in neoliberal thinking and a neoliberal paradigm. Before I worked in the States, well, I spent some time in England, and before that I worked in Ecuador when it was having a post neoliberal or anti-neoliberal moment. And one of the things that was really salient there was something that actually a development economist at the University of Cambridge describes as the way that neoliberalism colonized people’s minds, kind of like the inquisition colonized Spain. So it’s this kind of complete colonization of our imaginations of what’s possible that is kind of holding us back from pursuing more proactive state action and the kind of state action that we would need to actually make fundamental shifts in our economic structure and our productive structure to meet climate goals.
I think things like not just more proactive investments and the kinds of cares that we’ve been already quite readily handing out to the private sector to do industrial policy, but also more proactive use of things like public enterprises, public banks, like the development bank that Germany uses, so importantly in its own industrial policy. These kinds of policy tools are not really on the agenda right now. I think they’re still seen as being a bit outside of what’s imaginable. And I think that has to do with the fact that we are very much still stuck in having to jump through a number of narrative hoops to justify proactive state action and industrial policy.
David Goldstein:
Right. It’s socialism, right? State control of the economy, and that never works. China. I think your title is Deputy Director of Industrial Policy and Trade at the Roosevelt Institute. And I think that what’s opening the door to industrial policy is our largest trade competitor. I won’t say they’re our largest trade partner, is China, which has built its economy on industrial policy while we’ve focused on this neoliberal fetish for free markets. So we have been totally victimized by industrial policy that took advantage of the fact that they knew that we weren’t going to do anything defensive in response.
Isabel Estevez:
Exactly.
Nick Hanauer:
Is there an element, a specific element of the broad range of investments the Biden administration is making right now, or an element of one of the policies, whether it’s CHIPS or IRA or whatever it is, that you’re particularly excited about and that the detail of and could point to?
Isabel Estevez:
So yeah, the agricultural stuff is actually something that I think about quite often because some of the early work that I did when I came to the US and industrial policy was around government procurement policy. Public procurement of goods and services is one of the easiest access tools that we have in the industrial policy toolkit to influence the way that certain goods and services are made. So for example, right now the administration is using by clean government procurement standards to try to motivate and give preferences to producers that make steel, cement and certain other products in a cleaner way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. There’s a lot of momentum behind that, and I think it’s probably going to yield pretty positive results. But I think that same logic of procurement can be used in other sectors like agriculture, for example. In food procurement, we have schools across the country, government agencies across the country that make large purchases of food.
And to the extent that we could use this very powerful tool to make sure that we have certain standards around what kind of food is being purchased to ensure that their food is not just nutritious but also made sustainably and made by companies that respect labor rights, then I think we could also have pretty significant impact. So that’s one policy tool that I think because it is so low hanging and so easy access, has a lot of potential, and I would be excited to see that being applied to more sectors beyond heavy industry, like agriculture.
Nick Hanauer:
That’s really super interesting. Goldie, do you have any other questions?
David Goldstein:
No, I think we should, unless Isabel, there’s something in particular you’d like to discuss?
Isabel Estevez:
There is something, actually. I recently wrote a piece about a month ago where I talk about some of the lessons and the pitfalls of economic transformations. And that’s something that I was inspired to write because I am a development economist. I’ve studied, I’ve had a scholarship, and there are some recurring lessons that you see in the analysis of attempts at transforming economies across time. And I think there’s a number of lessons. I mean, this could be like three podcasts, but there’s at least one that I think is worth highlighting. And that’s one of the common pitfalls of historical experiences of economic transformation is really the failure to effectively manage class politics and to secure buy-in from a broad range of stakeholders.
So if you don’t have a broad based coalition, if you don’t engage relevant stakeholders in impacted communities in the policies that you’re designing, you first of all get worse policies. But then second of all, you also undermine the viability of industrial policy in the long run as public support erodes. And conversely, if you have effective democratic engagement, you get better diagnoses of the problems that you’re trying to solve, you get better policies and you build buy-in and momentum for more lasting change. So I think that’s a lesson that we really shouldn’t forget as we move forward with implementation. And that’s one thing that I really hope that we can work toward more proactively in the US.
David Goldstein:
I think that’s a great point. Because we talk a lot about, we use the word inclusion, we talk about the inclusionary principle in this podcast, and normally we’re talking about it in the economic sense of including people more fully in the economy, but that requires including people more fully in the development of the policies by which we will run and guide and grow our economy. And I don’t think we ever place enough emphasis on that.
Isabel Estevez:
For sure. And also not just the design, but the implementation itself. So that’s why I think these things, like these community benefit agreement standards, would be so important too, to mainstream across IRA investments.
David Goldstein:
You want to get to the final question, Nick?
Nick Hanauer:
Absolutely. Isabel, why do you do this work?
Isabel Estevez:
I studied economics in college, but I had a very, very neoclassical education. And what we were taught about development, what we were taught about was primarily microenterprise, microfinance, that kind of thing. So after college, I went to work in microenterprise and microfinance development in Ecuador where I was born in a very small indigenous community, working largely on local community development and sustainable agriculture. But when I was there, I remember feeling very frustrated because a lot of the issues that the community was facing and dealing with were things like lack of distribution systems, lack of quality jobs in the area so that parents didn’t have to travel eight hours away for several weeks at a time to provide for the family. Even actually bad procurement policies, that meant that their children had cookies for breakfast that were provided by some US multinational instead of the food that the community itself could provide more cheaply and with better quality.
So those are all things that couldn’t be solved at the local scale. So when I was kind of fortuitously offered an opportunity to work on economic development and industrial policy at the national scale, I took it, and that’s how I entered industrial policy. And I’ve been doing it ever since. But I think there’s another layer to this, which is that I grew up in Ecuador at the height of neoliberalism in the nineties, and that was a moment where things were pretty dire. Poverty had really gotten much worse. There were children begging on the streets, there were people committing suicide because they had their safety nets pulled out from under them. So I grew up feeling pretty indignant at what bad economic management can do to people. And that ignition can be a pretty powerful fuel.
David Goldstein:
We’re often angry at economics too, but in a more theoretical sense as opposed to personal experience. Nick has no reason to be angry at bad economics, because it’s worked out perfectly for him.
Isabel Estevez:
Fair.
Nick Hanauer:
Well, thank you so much for being with us, Isabel.
Isabel Estevez:
Thank you so much for having me. This was really fun.
David Goldstein:
So at the top of the pod, Nick, you talked about how transformational this is in terms of policy, that we are finally embracing industrial policy again in a way that we haven’t during the neoliberal era, really since Reaganism, the onset of Reaganism, the Reagan revolution. And I think what stands out for me is how transformational this is in terms of narrative. Not as much the fact that we’re doing it, but the fact that we’re able to talk about it again. And as I raised with Isabel, I wonder whether we are using the right language. Because I think part of the narrow approach to industrial policy comes from the fact that we’re using that narrow word, industrial.
Nick Hanauer:
Yeah, no, I think that that’s right. And I think, as Isabel said, we’ve let industrial policy become a widget maximization strategy. I think it’s even worse than that. I think it’s a profit maximization for the widget manufacturer’s strategy.
David Goldstein:
Because it’s how we measure how well industry is doing, is what are their profit margins.
Nick Hanauer:
Yeah, exactly. Not how much value they’re creating, but how rich the owners of the company are getting. And so I do think that we need to broaden the language and the definition of what this policy agenda is so that we can have a more successful argument about what the purpose of it is and how we know whether we’re doing it well or not. Because as you said in the pod, the point of it isn’t to build more widgets. The point of it is to ensure that the country, the people in the country, thrive. And there are all sorts of elements of that. Supply chain resilience, a more complex economy, higher wages for workers, better working conditions. There’s so many things that we should be focused on.
David Goldstein:
Right. And I think it’s important to note in this moment, again, as we talked about, this is not a new idea, it’s not a new term. Actually, you said we haven’t done this much since the Roosevelt administration. I’d suggest that the Eisenhower administration did a lot of industrial policy too. I mean, building the federal highway system, that was industrial policy. I mean, that was a lot of its purpose. I would say that the GI Bill, the expansion of public universities, public colleges and universities, and the fact that they used to be free or virtually free throughout the country, that was industrial policy because we were building the capacity of the US workforce. We were building a better educated workforce, which was necessary to building a new economy that was built on much more complex technologies.
And Isabel mentioned going back to Alexander Hamilton, and that brings up a point of how tied together industrial policy and trade policy is. And people are opposed to industrial policy, this idea that the government might be helping to direct or control or command the economy. And they’re doing that from this idea that it runs counter to this notion of free trade. That free trade is what makes us better, that we’ll let the market sort this out. And let’s be clear, the United States of America, our industrial economy was not built on free trade. It was built on industrial policy and protectionism. And also a fair amount of corporate espionage, if you want to be honest. And we did that for 100 years. 100 years we had this planned economy and this protectionist economy. And it wasn’t until we became an economic and industrial power that we’re like, oh, you know what? Free trade would be good because now we can open up markets to all of our products, right?
Nick Hanauer:
Yes, absolutely.
David Goldstein:
And that’s how the Japanese economy was built after the Second World War. And we were okay with that. We were okay with their exploitive policies because we wanted to rebuild an ally. And that’s how the South Korean economy was built. And that’s how the Taiwanese economy was built. And now that is how the Chinese economy is being built. And it’s not controlled as in Japan or South Korea by governments that broadly believed in free market capitalism. It is an economy that is being built by the Chinese Communist Party. And the idea that we can have a open market, free trade policy approach with a trading partner whose economy is being guided by the Chinese Communist Party, they do not believe in free trade, and they do not believe in free markets. That’s just crazy. I’m not being anti-Chinese or anti-communist here. I’m just saying that these two systems are at odds with each other.
Nick Hanauer:
Wake up and smell the coffee. We are not dealing with a partner like ours. They’re market authoritarians. And it’s a completely different game.
David Goldstein:
It is an entirely different game. And this gets back to one final thought on this whole thing. And that’s when we get to the climate. Right now as we’re recording this, it’s really comfortable here in Seattle. And that is rare in the United States. Half the country is under a prolonged extreme heat event. Climate change is happening now, and it should be obvious to anybody but the most ideological thinker that free markets are incapable of dealing with our climate crisis. Because as long as there are profits to be made by burning fossil fuels, we will burn fossil fuels.
We will burn them until the last drop of oil has been sucked out of the ground, regardless of how hot this planet gets. And so it requires industrial policy to do this existential shift from a carbon economy to a clean energy economy. And there’s no other way around it. You can’t do it with carbon credits, and it’s too late for a carbon tax. We need these investments now. We need these regulations now, and we need a strong federal government to impose and guide this transformation, however economically inefficient parts of it might be. That’s going to be a cost of it at this point because it’s too late to do it any other way.
Nick Hanauer:
No, I think you’re right. Well, we shall speak of this subject many more times and in many more ways.
David Goldstein:
And if you want to learn more about Isabel’s work, read her writing, we’ll have some links in the show notes, as always.
Narrator:
Pitchfork Economics is produced by Civic Ventures. If you like the show, make sure to subscribe, rate and review us wherever you get your podcasts. Find us on Twitter and Facebook at Civic Action and Nick Hanauer, follow our writing on Medium at Civic Skunkworks, and peek behind the podcast scenes on Instagram at Pitchfork Economics. As always, from our team at Civic Ventures, thanks for listening. See you next week.